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The Third Restatement's treatment of diplomatic and organizational
immunities, and of extradition law,1 committed to this reviewer, reveals
Professor Henkin's characteristic craftsmanship. His scholarship and er-
udition will make the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law a signal aid
to judges and practitioners. Yet the critical reader must raise the ques-
tion of what a Restatement should seek to accomplish beyond the scope
of an ordinary hornbook or practitioner's text.
The project of restating American law first flowered at the hand of
Joseph Story, the original Dane Professor of Law at Harvard and exegete
for John Marshall on the Supreme Court. In the early Republic, federal-
ism menaced as much as it promised, economically and intellectually.
Commerce can be as harshly taxed by the parochialism of disparate legal
systems as by any open tariff, requiring merchants who trade among
states to master costly detail. Localism may dampen the hope of culti-
vating law as a liberal art and as a vocabulary for a common politics.
Prompted by the dangers of centrifugal federalism, Story's comparative
law treatises made an early protest against isolation. Story drew on great
English judges of the common law and law merchant, civilians, and writ-
ers of the law of nations, as a frame for American law in commercial
subjects such as partnership, agency, bills of exchange, promissory notes,
and, to reconcile all, conflict of laws. 2 As capstone, Swift v. Tyson
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1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
pt. IV, chs. 6, 7B (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
2. Story's ambition for a unified American commercial law that would critically assess past
practice sets his work apart from his near contemporaries. Zephaniah Swift confined his 1795
"system" to the law of Connecticut, though he had subscribers in most other states. James
Kent's Commentaries on American Law, published from 1826 to 1830, did not seek to rival the
detailed mapping of commercial practice and the muster of comparative authority that so
intoxicated Story. Compare, for example, Kent's short essay on agency, lecture 41 of the
Commentaries, with Story's 1839 volume.
Nathan Dane, a Massachusetts lawyer once famed for his General Abridgment and Digest of
American Law, issued from 1823 to 1829, helped inspire Story's concern for a unified law, as
well as funding his Harvard chair. Unintelligible law was dangerous to liberty, warned Dane,
adding with historical largesse that Peter the Great had "soon understood every thing in the
civilized parts of Europe, but the laws; and because he could not understand them, he never
ceased to prefer the despotism of Turkey." The "evil to be feared" in America was "that so
many sovereign legislatures, and so many Supreme courts, will produce too much law, and in
too great variety .. " To Dane, like Story, the "true course" was "plain, that is, by degrees,
to make our laws more uniform and national, especially where there is nothing to make them
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promised that coherent jurisprudence in a country of separate state legal
systems might be advanced by an enlightened federal commercial bar,
administering a federal common law. In Swift's world of intellectual na-
tionalism, though there would be no automatic preemption of state law
in commerce among the states, federal courts would offer litigants in di-
versity an alternative forum and a federal gloss on the common law.
This annointment of a federal common law vanguard, leading the
states into the cosmopolitan world of lex mercatoria and universal juris-
prudence, did not survive Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,4 but by then
the American Law Institute had been founded to take its place. 5 The
revived idea for a restatement of American law is usually credited to
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, who was Southmayd Professor at Yale. In a
1914 address to the Association of American Law Schools, Hohfeld la-
mented "the complexities, the delays, the miscarriages of justice, the hob-
bles to business, and, in general, the enormous economic and social waste
that necessarily result from having approximately fifty diverging legal
systems with which to conteid."'6 Hohfeld intensely admired the 1896
German civil code, drafted over a 22-year period. The Btirgerliches
Gesetzbuch showed "what may be done by great jurists" in unifying the
law.7 But stating the law was not work for amateurs. For example, the
otherwise, but local feelings and prejudices. We have in the common and federal law, the
materials of national uniformity...." IN. DANE, GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF
AMERICAN LAW XiV-XV (1823). But Dane lacked Story's talent at composition, and Story's
ambition to bring together the law of England, Europe, and America.
Story began his treatise career, after two early formbooks on pleading in civil actions, by
annotating older English works with American cases. He adapted Chitty on bills of exchange,
Abbott on the law of shipping, and Lawes on assumpsit. Story's first major treatise, Commen-
taries on the Law of Bailments, with Illustrations from the Civil and Foreign Law, published in
1832, was followed in quick succession by the magisterial Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States (1833), and commentaries on the conflict of laws (1834), equity jurisprudence
(1836), equity pleadings (1838), agency (1839), partnership (1841), bills of exchange (1843),
and promissory notes (1845).
The scattering of Story's library of continental and English writers at the hands of the auc-
tion house of Phillips and Sampson following his death may be taken as the moment of passing
of a scholastic ideal in American law, revived perhaps with James Brown Scott in the early
1900's and, for the nonce, lost again.
3. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. One also suspects that by the time of Brandeis' decision in Erie, New Deal ambitions
made it clear that the power of the federal fise would work toward law uniformity in the long
run.
6. Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Universities Awak-
ened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day?, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS 76, 133 (1914) [hereinafter 1914 AALS PROCEEDINGS], also reprinted in W.
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 332, 379 (1923).
7. 1914 AALS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 89.
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New York legislature's statutory revision of real property law in 1830
had changed the law "quite disastrously." In an "era of conscious strug-
gle for change," counseled Hohfeld, the possible rashness of legislators
must be channeled by sage advice, through
the gradual building up of a class of university jurists-legal pathologists
and surgeons, we might call them-who shall have a far greater share and
influence than at present in prescribing for our ills in connection with the
constructive science and art of legislation.8
Hohfeld's own rather alarming proposals to unify American law
through constitutional amendment and to add a species of law lords to
state legislatures9 were wisely ignored. But University of Wisconsin
Dean Harry Richards and Professor Eugene Gilmore, serving as AALS
Presidents in 1915 and 1920, heard Hohfeld's call and proposed an aca-
demic center or institute to study the law "scientifically." Joseph Beale
of Harvard, engaged as architect, recommended adding the advice and
authority of other estates.10 A triarchic founding meeting of eminent
Professoren, judges, and practitioners was held in 1923 at the Continental
Memorial Hall in Washington, D.C., Elihu Root presiding and Holmes
and Taft in attendance, to secure collaboration of the three orders for this
"constructive scientific juristic work."' 1 With the Carnegie Corporation
as stage angel, the American Law Institute was begun, enlisting the trio
8. Id. at 88, 89.
9. Id. at 105, 113-14, 132-33.
10. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 115, 116,(1921). Joseph Beale's own address at the earlier 1914
convocation remains good reading and cures any belief that natural law succumbed to positiv-
ism in a single century. Nature and reason are now called science, but the faith is the same:
freed from localism, the study of social practice will discern normative principles to aid men's
reconciliation. American teachers of law should seek the heart of the common law not as a
"mere[ ] empirical study" as in England, but as "surely a philosophical system, a body of
scientific principle... which requires systemmatic statement in order that progress and reform
may be possible." Beale's hopes for a fundamental jurisprudence that would "analyse and
formally state the interests which it is the function of law to protect and the mutual relations of
these interests" will resound for those familiar with the later work of'Harold Lasswell and
Myres McDougal. Beale, The Necessity for A Study of Legal System, in 1914 AALS PRO-
CEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 31, 38, 40.
11. Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, 1 AM. L.
INST. PROC. 34-35 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Report]. The ALI's founding is discussed in the
1923 Report and in Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the First Restatement of
the Law, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS (1945). In tracing
the parenthood of a unified American law, one is bound to note that the Uniform State Law
Commissioners had been at work since 1889. Uniform statutes on sales and commercial paper
were widely adopted by the time of the ALI's founding. Eugene Gilmore was Secretary to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1919-20, when he put for-
ward the proposal for an academic law institute on behalf of the AALS.
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of Williston on Contracts, Beale on Conflicts, and Bohlen on Torts, as
the first Reporters for a "Restatement of the Law."
Rather than Swift's lure of choice-of-forum, the Restatements were to
convert purely by persuasion, providing state courts and legislatures with
the better view of the common law, attested by an eminent assembly lev-
ied from practice, court, and university. By including the corporate and
litigating bars in its deliberations, the American Law Institute could act
as a guild jury on commercial practice-coining recommendations mind-
ful of tradition, fair in light of the accepted ways of the craft, and practi-
cal in real life. The 1923 founders preferred common law to codification,
believing, as would have pleased John Dewey, that law needed continu-
ing adaptation. Courts should be able to modify past practice, and make
exceptions to avoid injustice. The Restatements were not to be rules, but
"principles", gaining influence by "sympathetic usage" and "the consid-
erate judgment of the craftsmen of the profession."1 2 The 1923 founders
also had the rather striking idea that Restatements could be adopted by
state legislators as legislative declarations of principle, rather than statu-
tory rules, entitled only to the same weight as the ratio of case prece-
dent. 13 But even without legislative endorsement, the Restateinents
gained an authority that would have been elusive for any lone scholar
publishing from his garret: balancing scholarship and prudence, de-
canting the "state of the law" from reported decisions, and adding the
elders' view of what was best, by graceful elision of "is" and "ought",
converting one to the other.
This project made great sense for areas of private law, such as con-
tracts, torts, property, agency, trusts, conflicts, restitution and judg-
ments. It is more curious, however, to conceive a Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law. Victory over state localism in a federal structure is not
the end in view. In recent decades at least, the states have asserted few
constitutional perogatives touching foreign relations. 14 Nor do publicists
12. Speech of John W. Davis, Feb. 23, 1923, in An Account of the Proceedings ofthe Organ-
ization ofthe Institute, 1 AM. L. INST. PROC. 113 (1923).
13. 1923 Report, supra note 11, at 27.
14. The dominance of the federal government in foreign relations was not always clear-cut
in the early nineteenth century. For example, in the settlement of the Northeastern border in
the Webster-Ashburton Treaty negotiations, state commissioners from Maine and Massachu-
setts were part of the American treaty delegation, under the aegis of Article IV, Section 3 of
the Constitution. The arrangement drove Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, to complain
that compromise was difficult when one of the parties is "a jealous, arrogant, democratic
Body." The Maine legislature, said Ashburton, is "wild and uncertain," and "unbounded De-
mocracy is always best propitiated by violent measures." Lord Ashburton to Lord Aberdeen,
April 25, 1842, in 3 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: CANADIAN
RELATIONS 1784-1860 706 (W. Manning ed. 1943). So, too, the states were recognized in
early extradition proceedings as having a substantial and independent police interest in exclud-
492
Vol. 14:489, 1989
Restatement: Immunity and Prescription
any longer seek to persuade national sovereigns that they must conform
their will to a law of reason or nature, established apart from the practice
and consent of nation-states. The Third Restatement takes a positivist
view in which international law is established by will and consent, not
derived from any transcendent principle of nature, reason, science, or
divinity. 15 The practicality that the Restatements sought in private law is
already part of the ethos of modern international law scholarship. The
customary and positive law of nations has developed in the last two cen-
turies on the assumption that idealism must be tempered with the de-
mands of practice, that fruitful cooperation is best encouraged by
realistic prescription. As Chief Justice Tilghman of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court said in 1823, struggling with Grotius' rule on extradition,
theory "is a beautiful thing, but attended in practice by many difficul-
ties." 16 The indispensable volumes of Moore, Hackworth, and White-
man, the yearbooks of the International Law Commission, the arcanely
indexed documents of the U.N. General Assembly, and the other innu-
merable sources for state practice and state aspiration, are testimony that
international lawyers have not recently supposed the law of nations to be
cast from an axiomatic system of Cartesian simplicity.
Most fundamentally, foreign relations law is difficult to "restate" be-
cause the legal notables of the academy, courthouse and bar do not domi-
nate prescription. In torts or contracts, at least in the days before the
ing foreign fugitives. See Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 540, 568-69 (1840); see also id.
at 614 (opinion of Justice Baldwin). The recent quarrels over the provision of local govern-
ment services to aliens show that local interests have not yet left an unchallenged field for the
operation of federal power. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ch. 1, introductory note; id. § 102 & comment. It re-
mains a mystery, in a positivist view, how customary international law is ever to be refined out
of practice. Customary law is said to require general practice and opiniojuris sive necessitatis,
the belief of states that the practice is legally obliging. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(2)
("Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation."); see also Statute of the International Court of
Justice, art. 38(l)(b). But where, said the chicken to the egg, is that "sense of legal obligation"
ever to come from? Opinio juris is left as self-referential. Opinio juris is a coherent require-
ment only if reformulated as a belief that the practice should be made legally obliging, a kind
of decentralized legislative tally, or if a modicum of natural law theory is permitted as its basis.
The modern positivist creed, distinguishing legal from moral duty, reigns sufficiently strong
that even privately professing naturalists may be inclined to disguise their belief behind the
psychology of state actors. Naturalism may also linger in accepting as a source of interna-
tional law, the "[g]eneral principles common to the major legal systems .... RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 102(4); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(l)(c) ("the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"). Universal recognition of a principle
may be valued as a token of consent to its use, but also as evidence of a foundation beyond
consent. As Locke's judicious Mr. Hooker declaimed, "[Tlhat which all men have at all times
learned, Nature herself must needs have taught ..... I RICHARD HOOKER, THE LAWS OF
THE ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 172 (1592) (Oxford ed. 1850). Consent may be evidentiary, as
well as justificatory.
16. Commonwealth ex rel. Short v. Deacon, 10 Serg. & Rawle 125, 130 (Penn. 1823).
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stakes were so high, prescription was more willingly left to the lawyers.
But in the world of international force and power, where the maxim salus
populi suprema lex est still holds some sway, the ratiocination of lawyers
may be only earnest prayer. The "foreign relations law" confronting an
American lawyer or judge is an admixture of constitutional law concern-
ing the relative power of the President and Congress, statutory law, bilat-
eral and multilateral treaty obligations-as well as customary
international law, and general principles of international law acted upon
by the Executive or transformed into federal common law by courts in
their decision-making. Prescriptive powers belong as much to politicians
and diplomats as to judges, in creating international practice and in com-
peting for control of foreign policy in the free zone between the President
and Congress, so largely nonjusticiable. Prescriptive powers also reside
in foreign nations, as they contribute to multilateral and bilateral instru-
ments and to the practice that may become customary law. The triarchy
of school, bar, and bench has entered the realm of other sovereigns.
With less power to make law, the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law has retreated in part to the old-fashioned task of law reporting.
Computers and West should not purge our memory of the crucial func-
tion of older substantive treatises. These were valued not only for sug-
gestions on what the law should be, but-in a world where practitioners
would not have ready means of collecting the cases themselves-what
the law "was." With international issues abounding in cities that may
lack a depository of U.N. documents or a university international law
library, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law has the considerable
virtue of making the law findable.
Congress' recent legislative handiwork in foreign relations is profuse
and it is blessing just to find it gathered in one place. In diplomatic rela-
tions, for example, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was
finally ratified by the United States in 1972,17 and was implemented in
the Diplomatic Relations Act of 197818 and in the 1982 Foreign Missions
Act.19 American consular relations came under the governance of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 1969.20 The work at Vi-
enna was supplemented by the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
17. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force with respect to United States on Dec. 13, 1972).
18. 92 Stat. 808 (1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1982)).
19. 96 Stat. 283 (1982), as amended 99 Stat. 418 (1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 4301-
4316 (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
20. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No.
6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force with respect to United States in 1969).
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ishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 21
implemented in U.S. law by new criminal statutes.22 The immunity of
foreign nations as defendants has been regularized in the 1976 Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act,23 recasting the landscape for the Interna-
tional Organizations Immunities Act.24
The Restatement also acts to circumvent parochialism in legal educa-
tion. The intellectual worlds of domestic lawyers and international law-
yers have been so cabined in American law school training and at the
bar, that even such things as the relative standing of international law
publicists may be hard for a domestic judge to fathom. The comfort of
the American Law Institute's moniker provides considerable relief. In-
ternational law's pluralist methods of law-making and varied sources of
law also threaten to be unfamiliar. The interplay of treaty and custom-
ary law, the weight to be given to comity, unilateral declarations, or
other forms of state practice, are difficult to chart for lawyers used to
hierarchical systems of legislation and dispute resolution. (Surely I am
not the first to find that baptism in international waters recolors the view
of domestic lawmaking as well. Customary law is spoken, as M.
Jourdain might allow, on occasions we never imagined.)
But what makes a Restatement of Foreign Relations Law ultimately a
thwarting task is the decision to avoid legislative recommendation. The
pressing activity of legislators undoubtedly demands caution: restate-
ments may be ignored if they are too soon overtaken by a legislative tide.
Still, a restatement as envisioned by Hohfeld would address itself to the
full range of those who have prescriptive power. To Hohfeld, democ-
racy's unruly horse was to be guided by the advice of cavaliers even in
the keenest areas of the fight. Scientific jurists would address legislators
as well as judges. Hohfeld observed in his vade mecum, perhaps with
some alarm at measures of grass roots democracy,
legislation has become the chief agency in our legal growth ... I do not
think the present tendency will prove unfortunate in the end, provided that
we and all others who have a heavy responsibility in the matter do all that is
possible, directly and indirectly, to secure the right kind of legislation. 25
21. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No.
8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force with respect to United States in 1977).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 11, 112, 970, 1116, 1201 (1982); 31 C.F.R. 13.1-13.8 (1988).
23. 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)(3)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d),
1602-1611 (1982)).
24. 59 Stat. 669 (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288f (1982)).
25. Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 88 (emphasis in original).
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The 1923 Report from the founding meeting of the ALI took a quite
different view, preferring common law method to statute, advising that
only the quieter areas of the law should be sought. Said the 1923 Report,
Changes in the law which are, or which would, if proposed, become a mat-
ter of'general public concern and discussion should not be considered,
much less set forth, in any restatement of the law such as we have in
mind. 26
But the 1923 Report also preached against attempting to "restate" inter-
national law, on the ground that the bar and academy lacked the neces-
sary powers of persuasion. 27 Having taken the chance, it pitieth us to
decline address to the full range of those with prescriptive power. The
present Restatement of Foreign Relations Law promises to set out inter-
national standards separately, so that differences from American practice
are clear, but one misses advice on what American law should be, and on
what standards the United States might propose for multilateral accept-
ance. The roundheads of the Hill and Foggy Bottom might even wel-
come the counsel.
Perhaps a few words will be permitted the reviewer about the underly-
ing problems that the laws of immunity address. Whether domestic (leg-
islative, executive, or judicial), or international (diplomatic, consular,
head-of-state, sovereign, or organizational), the many forms of immunity
reveal common failures of the law as a system of agreement and social
control. 28 The limits of the law underlying the forms of immunity are at
least three: cost, culture, and cunning.
Immunity recognizes the heavy weight of transaction costs in any ap-
plication of the law-the out-of-pocket and opportunity costs from adju-
dication's long delays, its temporal and emotional distraction from other
duties, disruption of relationships and public airing of confidential infor-
mation, not to mention the cost of hiring gladiatorial talent. Immunity
also recognizes our lack of confidence in interpreters who are outside
shared interest or culture. The third limit in law is its incomplete ac-
26. 1923 Report, supra note 11, at 15. One might have charged the 1923 founders with
timidity, or more, in their disclaimer of any competence to address "changes in governmental
organization," "the law pertaining to taxation," "advocacy of novel social legislation, such as
old age or sickness pensions," or any "method of improving the relations between capital and
labor." Id. at 16.
27. Said Elihu Root's committee, "The unsuitability of a subject for immediate treatment
may come from a variety of causes.... it may not be in the power of the bar by a restatement,
however good, to attain desirable results. Such a subject is international law." Id. at 44.
28. Another form of immunity is geographical. When a person is outside the territorial
limits of a state, he may be immune in practice from the prescribing state's ability to have its
own law applied. For instance, even where questioned conduct falls squarely within a foreign
state's prescriptive jurisdiction, the principle that the courts of one nation will not apply the
penal laws of another, may create a form of adjudicative and enforcement immunity.
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knowledgment of our purposes, unser gegenwille, the unspoken inten-
tions that we will not or cannot confess, but cannot disclaim in practice.
Immunity exists in part to account for this "law of our members."'29
The regimes of immunity are constituted by choices in five matters:
(a) the jurisdiction against which immunity is granted. Do we only bar
jurisdiction to adjudicate and enforce? Or also jurisdiction to prescribe?
(b) the form of liability against which immunity is granted. Criminal?
Civil only?
(c) the scope of activity immunized. Private business as well as public
duty? All acts occurring in connection with the performance of an office?
Only acts properly part of the office?
(d) duration of the immunity. During tenure in office only, even if with
grace periods before and after? So long as the offender remains outside
the jurisdiction where the disputed conduct took place? Forever?
(e) the role of the actor's mental state in defining the scope of immune
activity. Is it necessary or sufficient to have subjective good faith, an ac-
tual belief in the legality of conduct? Is reasonableness of belief necessary
or sufficient? What if the actor believes his conduct is part of his official
duties, but is mistaken?
Differences in immunity regimes might be explained by a single ade-
quate theory of immunity, but in modem practice, one soon discovers
that no single principle easily accounts for the many variations. The
three traditional theories of justification for immunity, sometimes not
clearly separated, are:
i) The nature of sovereignty. To either a positivist or natural lawyer, it
would seem incompatible with the independent and equal sovereignty of
nation-states for one state to legislate for another, or to punish an indi-
vidual for carrying out an act which his state had a right to commit.30
Older notions that sovereignty is God-given or sacred, or that an emis-
sary of high rank is the personal delegate of a sovereign ruler, may also
cast a state representative in sanctifying light; ideas of national dignity do
the same.31
29. Romans 7:14-25.
30. One example, though not called immunity by name, is the separate regime of the law of
war. This regime immunizes soldiers from the exercise of ordinary domestic criminal jurisdic-
tion. The acts of war are not formed from soldiers' own intention; in legal gaze it is the sover-
eign acting. Only if the soldiers violatejus in bello, or arguably, if the state's resort to war is
forbidden byjus ad bellum and the military actors are of high rank, will they become person-
ally liable for homicidal acts.
31. E.g., DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 50.7.18 (A. Watson ed. 1985); CICERO, PHILIPPICS 8.8
(W. Ker ed. 1927); Livy i.24 (B. Foster ed. 1919).
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ii) The limits of prescriptive and other jurisdiction. Only when one
begins with the Enlightenment premise that domestic legal regimes do
not vary with the rank of person, is the conception of "immunity"
needed. In an earlier age, when the legal equality of persons was not
assumed and applicable law might vary according to status even for do-
mestic subjects, what we call immunity could also be conceived as a
boundary of a legal rule.3 2 In an age of domestic equality, prescriptive
jurisdiction reaches all persons within the territory of the legislator, as
well as persons abroad where justifiable on theories of nationality, do-
mestic effect, or protection of security. Enforcement jurisdiction remains
largely territorial. A foreign emissary who is present in your territory
only to serve mutual interests may seem much like a litigant who is mak-
ing a "special appearance"; he enters the jurisdictional reach of the law-
giver and enforcer only on condition that a fiction of extraterritoriality is
indulged.
iii) Functionalism. Things may work better if law is suspended, for no
ambassador would venture forth unless he had a safe conduct. Ex-
tending immunities through custom or agreement will depend on the
judgment that other means tolerably deter misconduct by emissaries,
when balanced with the advantage gained by embassage.
These theories tincture any discussion of immunity, but in a time of
little consensus on foundations, functionalism carries the day. Cost, cul-
ture, and cunning are really functionalist explanations.
A first failure of law is cost and delay. We provide forms of immunity
because the distraction and expense of appearing in court are severe, de-
laying the performance of public duties, even discouraging their pursuit.
The law's costly choreography, its demands on calendars and consuming
anxiety, is something we ignore for ordinary citizens; we decline to pro-
vide counsel for indigent civil defendants or to require any demonstrated
factual predicate for filing a civil suit (a puzzle to those of us who were
32. An example is the "benefit of clergy" in English criminal law. Though cleric and king
would hardly agree whether the immunity was a limit of the king's power or a matter of grace,
a defendant who could show membership in a religious order was exempted from ordinary
criminal sanctions, instead to be regulated and disciplined by his ecclesiastic superiors. Benefit
of clergy was later manipulated as a fiction to permit leniency to nonclerical persons; if a
defendant could read a passage from the Bible, showing the gift of literacy formerly reserved to
clerics, he was spared capital punishment. For many qualifications, see 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 439-57 (2d ed. 1898); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 293-302 (1909); Cheney, The Punishment of Felonous Clerks, 51
ENG. HIST. REV. 215 (1936), reprinted in C. CHENEY, THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND ITS
LAWS, 12TH-14TH CENTURIES XI (Variorum Reprints 1982) (includes 1981 bibliographic
note); Helmholz, Crime, Compurgation and the Courts of the Medieval Church, I LAW &
HIST. REV. 1, 7 & n.23 (1983), reprinted in R. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 119, 125 & n.23 (1987).
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born as criminal lawyers and find probable or reasonable cause to be .the
natural prerequisite to any exertion of public power). But the urgent
quality of some public duties and the exposure of officials to retaliation
have gained a modest recognition of the need to subordinate litigation to
other purposes.
In a functionalist theory of immunity, the degree of protection against
personal liability might vary with the importance of the official's work,
the ease with which he can be replaced, and his likely exposure to merit-
less claims, as against the adequacy of other controls on his conduct. So,
in the regime of the Vienna Conventions, accredited diplomats are given
absolute criminal immunity in all matters, and absolute civil immunity in
all matters other than personal transactions in real estate, business, and
probate. A top-level diplomat is a plausible target for harassment, privy
to sensitive, information that could be divulged under arrest, and, absent
hot-lines in real time, is conductor of communications that may be perti-
nent to war and peace. Lower-level Embassy personnel, assigned to ad-
ministration or technique, with duties more easily reassigned, enjoy full
criminal immunity but civil immunity only in carrying out their official
duties. Embassy service staff and all consular officials enjoy civil and
criminal immunity only for official acts, though consular officials are sub-
ject to arrest before trial only for a grave crime.33 There is debate on
whether some of these immunities run against prescription or only
against adjudication and enforcement. The new "restrictive view" sug-
gested by the United States in regard to diplomatic immunity-limiting
its duration to the period of a diplomat's accreditation, and permitting
prosecution for private acts if the diplomat should return to the United
States as an ordinary visitor-is most easily rationalized as a recognition
of the procedural cost of the law.
In our own domestic legal regime, everything is ratcheted downward
from the diplomatic. Only the President, judges, jurors, court witnesses,
and prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil damages for official
acts, and in the last only for juridical acts in a court setting.34 Other
33. Officials of international organizations are given absolute immunity only for official
acts, though one chafes at the explanation that it is because their duties are less critical than
diplomats'. Diplomats assigned as heads of missions to international organizations are ac-
corded the absolute immunity of their bilateral peers.
34. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978);
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976).
Officials who act as judges and prosecutors in agency proceedings enjoy the same absolute
immunity as their judicial cousins. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978).
Like court players, the President enjoys personal immunity in his official acts only from civil
damages, not criminal penalties, although it is debatable whether a President could be crimi-
nally prosecuted without first being removed from office by impeachment. See, e.g., Bickel,
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executive officers, even Cabinet members and governors, are shielded
from claims of constitutional tort only by a qualified immunity-origi-
nally requiring the official to believe in the legality of his conduct, and to
have an objectively reasonable basis for that belief.35 The defendant's
actual belief rarely could be demonstrated through undisputed facts on a
motion for summary judgment, much less prior to discovery; even for
domestic governance, the Supreme Court concluded that the procedural
cost was too high for the gain in compensation and deterrence of illegal
conduct. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court abolished the subjective
prong of the test, casting belief adrift, and allowing full civil immunity
whenever the official could show the law's sharp edge had earlier been
"objectively" indistinct.36
In Congressional immunity, the Constitution affords Senators and
Representatives exemption from arrest for misdemeanors that do not
breach the peace, even arising from private conduct, but only during at-
tendance at Congress or getting there and back; immunity is again pre-
mised on the high cost of distraction. In part to prevent distraction,
though also to limit prescriptive jurisdiction and protect legislative inde-
pendence, the speech or debate clause forbids the questioning of a Sena-
tor or Representative for any legislative act, or even its introduction into
evidence in a proceeding against him, though it does not save him from
prosecution for corrupt promises. 37
The second ill-kept secret of the law is that we rarely trust its measure
to an adjudicator, absent a supporting political culture or shared interest
that constrains interpretation. Whatever our views on the determinacy
of legal texts, it is clear that reasons can be given in law-like language for
results we find unfaithful to the intention of a project. The United States
The Constitutional Tangle, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1973, at 14-15. Placement of the
decision to prosecute in public hands, rather than private, the requirement of a preliminary
showing to a grand jury, and the demanding mens rea requirement of criminal law, minimize
the problems of harassment, though some might entertain a worry about the Independent
Counsel Act.
Besides the President, Harlow v. Fitzgerald suggested, there might be a small class of top-
level officials in "such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy [where] absolute
[civil] immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions
vital to the national interest." 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982). This suggestion was abandoned by a
plurality in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), rejecting absolute immunity for the Attor-
ney General for ordering warrantless domestic security wiretaps.
35. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500-01 (1978); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511
(1985).
36. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-18 (1982). See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183
(1984); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 812 n.1 (1985); Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.
Ct. 3034 (1987).
37. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487-94 (1979). State legislators enjoy similar
immunity. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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may hedge its faith in a World Court, a commercial, party may distrust
an arbitrator'who does not intend to stay in the business, because they
fear the absence of shared purpose that informs a domestic court's
interpretation.
So, too, in diplomatic relations. The absolute immunity of ambassa-
dors for all public and most private acts reflects each country's concern
that its antagonists may not agree on the scope of official functions. The
Vienna Convention is notably imprecise in defining the functions of a
mission. What would happen to Embassy personnel who meet with or
give advice to political dissidents, travel to restricted areas, or gather in-
formation from highly placed government sources outside the ordinary
channels of diplomatic address? For domestic civil servants, limiting im-
munity to a reasonable construction of the office's duties enjoys the com-
fort of the greater intelligibility of domestic law to those who act within
it, and the shared purpose of courts, citizens, and executive officials in
preferring lawful but effective government. 38
As immunity is necessary in light of disparate purpose, so does it de-
pend on some shared pursuits. Foreign antagonists still may share an
international political culture; belief that diplomatic immunity is gainful
undergirds the doctrine. What has strained the practice of immunity in
recent years, is the breach of understandings of self-restraint. Diplomatic
bags have world-old been misused to smuggle monies or contraband, but
the new dangers of narco-diplomacy put pressure' on the inviolability of
the courier's pouch. The standard now reached in the draft U.N. con-
vention is that a diplomatic bag can be returned if there are "serious
reasons to believe" it has been misused. 39 The absolute immunity of dip-
lomats and their mission has been accepted on the understanding that the
sanctuary would not be exploited for morally heinous acts. But consen-
sus again has been disturbed by violent incidents, such as the attempted
kidnapping of a dissident by officials of Nigeria's London embassy, the
38. Yet worries about cultural distance and dissympathy are not limited to the foreign
arena. The breathtaking expansion of domestic executive immunity in Harlow may reflect the
Supreme Court's unspoken belief that judges, whose occupation is reflective and revisory, are,
in a sense, of a different culture from law enforcement officers and executive branch adminis-
trators who are inclined to action and may feel more personally responsible for public safety-
and in turn, that constitutional commentary has become too recondite for full understanding
by ordinary observers. Cf Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 196, quoting P. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT 66 (1983) ("officials are subject to a plethora of [administrative] rules, 'often so
voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such flux that officials can only comply
with or enforce them selectively.'... In these circumstances, officials should not err always on
the side of caution.").
39. Seventh Report on the Status of the Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic Bag Not
Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/400, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10)
at 24 (1986).
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shooting of a British police officer from the Libyan embassy, and, in an
earlier decade, an attempt of the Soviet Union to forcibly repatriate a
national through its New York consulate. The acceptability of immunity
depends on the condition that license will be used with self-restraint; it
exists in a curious zone where suspicion is hemmed by trust.
The law often pulls between aspiration and fallen nature. Law may
announce what we would like to believe about government, what we wish
for as reciprocal practice among countries. It is sometimes less articulate
in acknowledging what we will abide: whether it is the exercise of less
pluralistic control of foreign affairs through inherent Article II powers of
the Presidency (powers perhaps deliberately left uncharted so that they
may be available in true emergency, but subjected to constant dispute
and reproach so that they will not be too casually exercised), or the viola-
tion of norms of preferred conduct in international relations, such as the
practice of governments, despite Henry Stimson, of reading each other's
mail. The Vienna treaty immunized diplomatic officials in activities no
one wished to acknowledge or approve, such as procuring restricted de-
fense information from the enemy, activities which the signatories may
have silently recognized were necessary in each country's view, and
deterrable to acceptable limits through other devices of control, such as
by limiting the size of missions, vigorously exercising the power of expel-
ling diplomats as personae non gratae, and prosecuting non-immune pri-
vate citizens. 4°
40. Perhaps too great tolerance of human imperfection entered domestic law in Harlow.
Absent a state of emergency, the law governing domestic affairs has assumed that public safety
can subsist with legal regularity. Surely an official should not be encouraged to act in a way he
strongly believes will be found illegal, even if the law has not yet been settled. Harlow creates a
latitude, a curtilage of protection, for officials who may doubt the legality of their action, but
find no compelling rule. Executive officials need no longer adhere to a self-denying reading of
how the law will be declared, and their personal convictions about legality are unexaminable.
Where the underlying law is unsettled, where there is not yet a "clearly established statutory or
constitutional right[ ]," see 471 U.S. at 812 n.l, is it really true that anything goes?
Even the Harlow majority initially seemed to shrink from this extreme; while the Harlow
opinion cut off discovery and trial on bare-bones pleading, on any "bare allegation[ ] of mal-
ice," 457 U.S. at 817, with officials to be "generally ... shielded" from trial unless the law was
clear at the time of violation, id. at 818, the opinion seemed to leave open possible liability if
the plaintiff came to court with cogent threshold evidence to show an official believed he was
violating a constitutional right. Such a belief would spell bad faith in the Scheuer v. Rhodes
sense. Since that time, however, Harlow has been read to preclude offering any evidence con-
cerning subjective intention. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 191; Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. at 812 n.l; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 517, 524, 530. The Harlow Court's continued
use of the phrase "qualified or 'good faith' immunity" has become a misleading solecism-for
faith now has nothing to do with it.
A more moderate solution could have been invented by adopting pleading rules similar to
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), allowing a case to proceed past a motion to dismiss
only where the plaintiff already possesses strong evidence that the official believed or had rea-
son to believe he was violating constitutional requirements. Discovery, after all, began as a
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There is at least one instance in which the Restatement appropriately
accommodates fallen nature. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
lations announces that the premises and archives of an embassy are invio-
lable, and that the host state must "protect free communication" by the
mission for official purposes.41 Yet the United States' Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 197842 explicitly permits the electronic surveil-
lance of foreign government offices upon warrant from the FISA court.
Congress concluded these two standards were not at odds, that FISA did
not violate the Vienna Convention's inviolability guarantee, but in the
unlikely event of conflict, provided that FISA would supersede the ear-
lier treaty.43 The Restatement points to the assumed international prac-
tice of electronic surveillance, something the very proper International
Law Commission deliberations never spoke a word about, pronouncing:
The Vienna Conventions draw no explicit distinctions among means of
communication, implying that the privacy of all diplomatic or consular
communications must be respected. It is common practice, however, for
states to monitor telephonic or telegraphic communication by accredited
foreign missions or consulates in their territory, and to attempt to "break"
their cryptographic codes.44
While this may seem old hat to readers of The New York Times, sev-
eral recent espionage cases prosecuted by the United States illustrate the
usefulness of such realism. In several cases, including one prosecuted by
this writer, foreign espionage defendants claimed that alleged govern-
ment surveillance practices breached the Vienna Convention. The super-
seding effect of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act would have
mooted the issue so far as U.S. law was concerned, under the last-in-time
rule. But it is most straitening to imagine a court offering obiter on the
international legality of alleged surveillance, while ignorant of the "com-
mon practice" 45 of states that Would logically inform a working interpre-
tation of the Vienna Convention. The Restatement reporters can take
"judicial notice" of matters that governments are unable to discuss, al-
lowing judges access to a more worldly understanding of treaty
provisions.
remedy in chancery. Closer attention to its equity would make unnecessary the harsh triage of
Harlow, in.which even compelling proof of an official's unconstitutional intention is turned out
of doors.
41. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 17, arts. 22, 24, 27(1), 27(2),
27(3).
42. 92 Stat. 1783 (1978), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982) [hereinafter FISA].
43. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978); H. REP. No. 1281, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 70 (1978); S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 56 (1978).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 466 comment f.
45. Id.
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To return to the matter of legislation and multilateral proposal, let me
point out a number of archaic qualities in the present administration of
the law of immunity, which the Restatement does not go far enough to
address. First, there is no principled reason to have any lacuna in the
regulation of the conduct of immunized personnel, even where the regu-
lation must be undertaken through unusual jurisdiction. For example,
our diplomatic personnel stationed abroad enjoy complete criminal im-
munity from foreign law, yet they are not subject to any assimilative U.S.
law for common law crimes committed abroad, unless they happen to act
within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. If we wish to promote law-abiding conduct among foreign coun-
tries' personnel as well as our own, this prescriptive gap is hardly a wor-
thy example. In 1972, for instance, an American Embassy staff member
committed a homicide, and was prosecutable only because he acted
within the Embassy grounds, considered by American law to be part of
its special territorial jurisdiction.46
Second, it is surprising that we have not proposed a good faith duty to
waive diplomatic immunity for serious criminal conduct, at least where
there is otherwise a failure of justice and where the sending country finds
the evidence convincing, the conduct criminal by the legal standards of
both countries and similarly punished, foreign adjudicative procedures
sufficiently close to domestic standards of due process, and no prejudice
to national interest. (One could apply here criteria similar to extradition
decisions.) Under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, the Secretary General has a duty to waive immunity in
appropriate cases for U.N. personnel.47 The Restatement does not take a
position on whether that duty should be extended to diplomatic person-
nel. Of course any change in multilateral law is hard to effect, but a
46. United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
Diplomatic immunity does not protect a diplomat from the jurisdiction of his own sending
state, per article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 17. The Restatement acknowl-
edges that this article was "apparently added to encourage sending states to dssure a compe-
tent forum for hearing cases against members of their diplomatic missions abroad."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 464 reporters' note 9. But the Restatement does not point out the
lacuna in American jurisdiction or suggest a cure.
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 newly allows federal pros-
ecution of physical violence against American nationals abroad, but only where the Attorney
General certifies the offense was "intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a govern-
ment or civilian population." 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (Supp. 1986).
47. Section 20 of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 21
U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 15; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 469 comment f.
Similarly, under section 14 of the Convention, a member state of the United Nations "not only
has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its representative in any case where
in the opinion of the Member the immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be
waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded,"
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Restatement designed to perdure for a generation should point toward at
least some appropriate changes.4 8
Third, there is no reason why the losses caused by immune personnel
should not be compensated. In the case of auto accidents, Congress fi-
nally provided in the Diplomatic Relations Act in 1978 that losses would
be spread through mandatory insurance.49 Why stop at cars? The costs
of other forms of tortious activity might sensibly be spread, by insurance
or indemnification by the federal government, rather than left as a dis-
proportionate loss on the unhappy interlocutors of diplomats.50 Emerg-
ing principles of international state responsibility also may suggest that
the sending country should compensate for some torts committed by its
diplomats abroad, even when liability is not enforceable in domestic
courts.
5 1
A Restatement might also propose a way of reconciling the indepen-
dence of special prosecutors with the demands of diplomatic immunity.
Such a measure could prevent repetition of the recent imbroglio in which
Independent Counsel Whitney North Seymour, Jr., issued a subpoena to
the Canadian Ambassador in the course of the Michael Deaver prosecu-
tion. 52 While most government trial subpoenas issue without specific au-
thorization by the trial judge, it would be reasonable to require that no
subpoena be delivered'to any person arguably immune under the Vienna
Convention until the State Department has had an opportunity to advise
of its position on immunity and, in the event of a dispute, until the court
has made a preliminary finding that the named witness is not immune.
48. The Restatement notes in deadpan, "Since it is increasingly accepted that diplomatic
immunity is based on 'functional necessity,'. . . it has been suggested that a sending state
should waive immunity in every case in which waiver would not interfere with the functions of
the diplomatic mission." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 464 reporters' note 15. But the Restate-
ment takes no position for or against this suggestion.
49. 22 U.S.C. § 254e (1982); State Department Regulations on Compulsory Liability In-
surance of Diplomatic Missions and Personnel, 22 C.F.R. 151.1-151.11 (1987) (requiring in-
surance for vehicles, vessels, and aircraft); State Department Circular Note of June 18, 1981,
reprinted in 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 939 (1981).
50. Moral hazard is less of a problem where the insurance is mandatory, the beneficiaries
are third parties, and there are reputational costs to tortious conduct. Insurance companies
can estimate by experience the probability even of intentional conduct.
51. See Article 6 of the Draft Articles on the Content, Forms and Degrees of International
Responsibility, proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his Fifth Report, A/CN.4/380 at 4-9,
A/CN.4/380/Corr. 1 (1984), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY 341 (M. Spinedi & B. Simma eds. 1987). Those who choose to deal with diplo-
mats in contractual relations might be appropriately excluded from any domestic scheme to
spread losses, since they can estimate the risk beforehand.
52. See N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1987, at Al, col. 1; May 28, 1987, at Al, col. 1; Oct. 17,
1987, § 1, at 10, col. 1; Oct. 27, 1987, at A30, col. 1. The Deaver incident took place after the
closing date of the Restatement.
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In regard to former heads-of-state, the claim of immunity from juris-
diction to adjudicate traverses delicate matters of foreign policy and our
relationship to foreign governments. Though head-of-state immunity
arises under federal common law, here the Restatement rests with an
unenlightening agnosticism. Noting the Marcos litigation, it remarks, "a
former head of state appears to have no immunity from jurisdiction to
adjudicate," adding only "[i]n the United States, the courts might grant
immunity if suggested by the Executive Branch on foreign policy
grounds, even though it is not required by international law."'53 But
what, pray, should a court do? In recent decades courts have been less
wont to defer to Government suggestions in matters of foreign affairs.
Guidance for a court, were the U.S. Government to suggest former head-
of-state immunity, would be most helpful.
One worries at times that, even when it means to be nonprescriptive,
the Restatement takes too brisk a view of things. Where law moves in
lambent light, the Restatement seeks starkness. For example, the Restate-
ment commentary says "[t]he Department of State will usually certify
whether a person has diplomatic status in the United States, and that
certification is binding on the courts."' 54 That was more surely the law in
the pre-Vienna era. Even now any certification by the State Department
concerning diplomatic status deserves extraordinary deference in a U.S.
court, lest judges get into the business of redesigning U.S. protocol for
acceptance and rejection of diplomats. But in the most recent case on
diplomatic immunity, the court of appeals' careful study of the defend-
ant's indicia of status does not suggest blind unreviewability. 55
In its treatment of extradition, the Restatement fails to take any posi-
tion on or suggest any change in the so-called political offense exception.
This doctrine is of central importance since it can effectively immunize
serious acts of political violence, and, with the non-appealability of these
Article I decisions, 56 is an area where extradition magistrates pointedly
need guidance. The Restatement's historiography of the doctrine begins
only in 1890, ignoring a rich earlier history, including Daniel Webster's
1846 view that the political offense exception did not protect the common
crimes of murder or arson even when committed in political tumult.5 7 It
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 464 reporters'-note 14.
54. Id. § 464 comment f (emphasis added). The reporters' note repeats, "A certification
by the Department of State that an individual is, or is not, a diplomatic agent, communicated
to a court in the United States, is binding on the court." Id. § 464 reporters' note 1.
55. United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881
(1985).
56. United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
57. Cong. Globe App., 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 536 (Apr. 7, 1846).
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is a pity the Restatement did not suggest legislative reform to make extra-
dition determinations appealable, nor give its own view of the appropri-
ate standards for immunity for political crimes in extradition. For a
Hohfeldian, it is precisely the areas inspiring public reaction in which the
counsel of scholars and the bar is most needed.
